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Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)

Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Fri, 28 March 2014 19:55 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Nuking DHE in favour of ECDHE (Was: Re: Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3)
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As a point of reference, IKE has done well with standardized groups, and basically no one uses non-standard groups. It's not clear why TLS would be any different, given that it is the same "client offers many, server picks one" model.

--Paul Hoffman

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