Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3

Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com> Mon, 28 September 2020 11:12 UTC

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From: Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Sep 2020 13:12:23 +0200
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To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org, uta@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
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Hi Hannes

The TLS-SE code is now published
 https://github.com/purien/TLS-SE

It also comprises software tools for testing

This code is a TLS1.3 ECDH-PSK server for a javacard as specified in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-01

It has been tested with several javacard 3.04

This code also implements https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-im-03

Pascal


Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 17:05, Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
a écrit :

>
>
> Ping me when it becomes available or post a link to the UTA mailing list.
>
>
>
> *From:* Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, September 21, 2020 4:18 PM
> *To:* Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
>
>
>
> Not at this moment but the code will be pusblished on github
>
>
>
> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 15:30, Hannes Tschofenig <
> Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> a écrit :
>
> Thanks for the details.
>
>
>
> Is the code for the tls13 server on the javacard open source?
>
>
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, September 21, 2020 2:54 PM
> *To:* Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
> *Cc:* Filippo Valsorda <filippo@ml.filippo.io>io>; tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
>
>
>
> tls-se memory footprint is
>
> flash 《 40KB
>
> ram   《 1KB
>
>
>
> time to open a tls session 1.4 seconds
>
>
>
>
>
> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 14:47, Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com> a
> écrit :
>
> hi Hannes
>
>
>
> no openssl or wolfssl are used as client in order to check
> interoperability with tls-se server
>
>
>
> tls-se is of course a specific implémentation for tls13 server in
> javacard..it is written in java but an ôter implémentation is written in c
> for constraint notes. as written in the draft tls-se implementation has
> three software blocks: crypto lib, tls state machine, and tls lib
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 14:36, Hannes Tschofenig <
> Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> a écrit :
>
> Hi Pascal,
>
>
>
> are you saying that the stack on the secure element uses WolfSSL or
> OpenSSL? I am sure that WolfSSL works well but for code size reasons I
> doubt OpenSSL is possible. Can you confirm?
>
>
>
> In case of WolfSSL, you have multiple options for credentials, including
> plain PSK, PSK-ECDHE, raw public keys, and certificates as I noted in my
> mail to the UTA list:
>
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/uta/RJ4wU77D6f7qslfwrc16jkrPTew/
>
>
>
> Ciao
>
> Hannes
>
>
>
> *From:* Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, September 21, 2020 2:01 PM
> *To:* Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
> *Cc:* Filippo Valsorda <filippo@ml.filippo.io>io>; tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
>
>
>
> Hi Hannes
>
>
>
> Yes it has been tested with several  3.04 Javacards  commercially available
>
>
>
> In the draft https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00   Section
> 5-ISO 7816 Use Case, the exchanges are done with the existing implementation
>
>
>
> TLS-SE TLS1.3 PSK+ECDH server works with ESP8266 or Arduino+Ethernet
> boards
>
>
>
> For client software we use OPENSSL or WolfSSL
>
>
>
> Pascal
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 12:35, Hannes Tschofenig <
> Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> a écrit :
>
> Hi Pascal,
>
> Thanks for the pointer to the draft.
>
> Since I am surveying implementations for the update of RFC 7925 (see
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-uta-tls13-iot-profile/) I was
> wondering whether there is an implementation of this approach.
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
>
> From: Pascal Urien <pascal.urien@gmail.com>
> Sent: Monday, September 21, 2020 11:44 AM
> To: Hannes Tschofenig <Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com>
> Cc: Filippo Valsorda <filippo@ml.filippo.io>io>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] The future of external PSK in TLS 1.3
>
> Hi All
>
> Here is an example of PSK+ECDHE for IoT
>
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-urien-tls-se-00  uses TLS1.3 server
> PSK+ECDHE for secure elements
>
> The security level in these devices is as high as EAL5+
>
> The computing time is about 1.4s for a PSK+ECDHE session (AES-128-CCM, +
> secp256r1)
>
> The real critical resource is the required RAM size, less than 1KB in our
> experiments
>
> The secure element  only needs a classical TCP/IP interface (i.e. sockets
> like)
>
> Trusted PSK should avoid selfie attacks
>
> Pascal
>
>
>
> Le lun. 21 sept. 2020 à 11:29, Hannes Tschofenig <mailto:
> Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com> a écrit :
> Hi Filippo,
>
> • Indeed, if the SCADA industry has a particular need, they should profile
> TLS for use in that industry, and not require we change the recommendation
> for the open Internet.
>
> We have an IoT profile for TLS and it talks about the use of PSK, see
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7925
>
> On the “open Internet” (probably referring to the Web usage) you are not
> going to use PSKs in TLS. There is a separate RFC that provides
> recommendations for that environmnent, see RFC 752. That RFC is currently
> being revised, see
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheffer-uta-rfc7525bis/
>
> Ciao
> Hannes
>
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