Re: [TLS] Data volume limits

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 28 December 2015 19:55 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Dec 2015 14:54:35 -0500
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To: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Data volume limits
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Scott, Henrick,

Are you persuaded by Watson's analysis?

Thanks,
-Ekr




On Mon, Dec 21, 2015 at 7:41 AM, Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> wrote:

> On Tuesday 15 December 2015 20:01:58 Bill Frantz wrote:
> > So we have to trade off the risks of too much data vs. the risks
> > of a complex rekey protocol vs. the risks having the big data
> > applications build new connections every 2**36 or so bytes.
> >
> > If we don't have rekeying, then the big data applications are
> > the only ones at risk. If we do, it may be a wedge which can
> > compromise all users.
>
> if the rekey doesn't allow the application to change authentication
> tokens (as it now stands), then rekey is much more secure than
> renegotiation was in TLS <= 1.2
>
> so if we include rekeying in TLS, I'd suggest to set its limit to
> something fairly low for dig data transfers, that is gigabytes, not
> terabytes, otherwise we'll be introducing code that is simply not tested
> for interoperability
>
> (with AES-NI you can easily transfer gigabytes in just few minutes)
> --
> Regards,
> Hubert Kario
> Senior Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
> Web: www.cz.redhat.com
> Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic
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