Re: [TLS] Call for consensus: Removing 0-RTT client auth

On Thu, Mar 31, 2016 at 10:08 AM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:

> On 03/31/2016 12:02 PM, Bill Cox wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 31, 2016 at 5:17 AM, Hannes Tschofenig <
> <hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net>hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net> wrote:
>
>> Hi Sean,
>>
>> we at ARM would find it somewhat unfortunate to remove the client
>> authentication feature from the 0-RTT exchange since this is one of the
>> features that could speed up the exchange quite significantly and would
>> make a big difference compared to TLS 1.2.
>>
>
> Client certs can still be used with PSK 0-RTT, but only on the initial
> 1-RTT handshake.  it is up to the client to ensure that the security of the
> resumption master secret (RMS) is solid enough to warrant doing 0-RTT
> session resumption without re-verification of the client cert.
>
>
> That seems to rule out most corporate uses of client certs [for 0-RTT
> client authentication], since I doubt anyone will be interested in trusting
> that the client does so properly.
>

Do those servers generally carry over client auth through resumption?

-Ekr

>
> -Ben
>
> The simplest way to explain how the server should work in this case is to
> just say you need to emulate a session cache.
>
>
>
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