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[TLS] Re: Working group last call for the deprecation experimental code points in ECDHE-ML-KEM

Bas Westerbaan <bas@cloudflare.com> Wed, 05 November 2025 08:44 UTC

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From: Bas Westerbaan <bas@cloudflare.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Nov 2025 09:44:43 +0100
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Working group last call for the deprecation experimental code points in ECDHE-ML-KEM
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I support Joseph's proposal. One teensy nit, given the description of the
field, should we mention this is a "SHOULD NOT"?

On Wed, Nov 5, 2025 at 9:18 AM Bellebaum, Thomas <thomas.bellebaum=
40aisec.fraunhofer.de@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> So the WG rejects "D" as a means to warn against non-hybrids with some
> resoning that D is only "for weak cryptographic algorithms" [1], and would
> group it "with NULL ciphers, RC4, DES, EXPORT ciphers, MD5, etc" [2].
>

In a vacuum, to me the more egregious inconsistency is that we're not
marking traditional cryptography as "D": we know for sure they'll fall to
quantum attack, whereas practical attacks on (hybrid) ML-KEM-768 are mere
speculation. I do think it's better to wait a bit before marking
traditional crypto as "D", but not too long.

Best,

 Bas

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