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Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3

"Jack Lloyd" <lloyd@randombit.net> Thu, 27 March 2014 11:55 UTC

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Confirming Consensus on removing RSA key Transport from TLS 1.3
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On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 09:55:27AM +0100, Hanno Böck wrote:

> Appart from the other issues, I think it would make a lot of sense to
> change DHE handling in TLS 1.3 away from "server can have arbitrary
> parameters".

+1; it is simpler, saves handshake bytes, and prevents misconfigured
servers from doing stupid things like 512-bit DH. Something very much
like the existing EllipticCurveList (_without_ the explicit curve
option) seems like it would work well.

~Jack

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