[TLS] Closing WGLC (was Re: 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators)

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Tue, 16 June 2020 17:23 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2020 13:23:17 -0400
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Subject: [TLS] Closing WGLC (was Re: 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators)
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This message closes out the 3rd WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticators. I have created GH issues for the two issues raised during WGLC:
Once addressed, and assuming the changes are not large, we will progress this draft towards our AD.

I will put the draft in Waiting for WG Chair Go-Ahead / Revised I-D needed awaiting resolution of the two issues.

spt (for the chairs)

> On Jun 5, 2020, at 07:29, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 4, 2020 at 9:48 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>> Another reminder ...
>>> On May 22, 2020, at 09:23, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
>>> This is the 3rd WGLC for "Exported Authenticators in TLS" draft available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/. The secdir review during IETF LC raised some issues and as a result there have been a couple of new versions. Please respond to the list with any comments by 2359 UTC on 8 June 2020.
> I've implemented earlier drafts. I do have a concern with the
> validate API as presented in the draft: it treats empty authenticators
> as valid, and then returns the identity as a certificate chain that
> must be validated by the application. Similar APIs have lead to easily
> foreseeable pwnage. Instead I would recommend the validate API carry
> out X509 validation against a trust store or validation function and
> treat the empty authenticator as invalid. That way someone has to
> think before not checking the certificate returned.
> Sincerely,
> Watson Ladd