Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-prohibiting-rc4-01.txt

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 23/10/14 21:49, Salz, Rich wrote:
>> I think there is a significant difference between the security (in
>> particular confidentiality) one gets with good and dodgy algorithms
>> which is sufficient to argue that the OS design pattern is
>> inappropriate to use with such dodgy algs.
> 
> I'm having trouble parsing things.  You don't mean "both good and
> dodgy," but rather "good compared with dodgy" or "good contrasted
> with dodgy"

Yep. I badly write:-) Fair comment though, I wasn't clear so
apologies. As you guessed, what I meant was:

  OS is a fine design pattern. Algorithms can be considered-good
  or dodgy. AES is considered-good. RC4 is dodgy. OS requires
  considered-good algorithms (I think). With dodgy algorithms
  (esp. with ciphertext-only attacks expected soon) OS is no
  better than cleartext for confidentiality. So we ought say
  to not use RC4 when following the OS design pattern.

> Sorry, you IE folks are just too good with words for a poor old yank
> like me :)

And meaninglessly but with more apologies this time to the
estates of Beckett and Joyce:

  Pervasive monitors record, having no alternative, nothing new.
  We may be startled as by a violation of our own privacy.
  As if it wasn't broken already.

Hopefully the latter is sufficiently .ie to pass mustard. And
now you've suggested it, I quite like the idea of Joyce
transcribing PM recordings, and sending those to Beckett the
analyst:-)

Cheers,
S.


> 
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