Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Mon, 14 March 2016 20:49 UTC

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Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 13:49:56 -0700
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From: =?UTF-8?Q?Colm_MacC=C3=A1rthaigh?= <colm@allcosts.net>
To: Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com>
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Cc: Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
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On Mon, Mar 14, 2016 at 1:47 PM, Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com>; wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 14, 2016 at 12:25 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>; wrote:
>
>> > It's worth keeping in mind this recent paper about Replay attacks
>> against HTTPS. TL;DR: Attackers can already force a browser to replay
>> requests basically at will. ​As a result, it's not clear that 0-RTT replay
>> makes this situation worse.
>>
>> TLS is more than just browsers, which is what started this thread I think
>>
>
> I was responding to a comment about HTTP, though :> I agree that the
> implications of 0-RTT for other applications will be different.​
>

HTTP is much more than browsers;  there's a lot of non-browser APIs built
on top of it (aka web services and micro services). Across many vendors,
these APIs are commonly not replay safe; or they are safe within the
confines a small number of retries, but not a large unbounded number.

-- 
Colm