Re: [TLS] [mogul-open] Interoperability testing

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Fri, 08 January 2010 01:11 UTC

From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
Message-Id: <201001080110.o081AX9a000051@fs4113.wdf.sap.corp>
To: mogul-open@lists.links.org
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 2010 02:10:32 +0100
In-Reply-To: <4B451355.4010108@bolyard.me> from "Nelson B Bolyard" at Jan 6, 10 02:48:53 pm
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Cc: iab@iab.org, tls@ietf.org, iesg@iesg.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] [mogul-open] Interoperability testing
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Reply-To: mrex@sap.com

Nelson B Bolyard wrote:
> 
> On 2010-01-06 14:30 PST, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> > I agree with Marsh here.
> > 
> > Any server which is going to implement this draft, SSLv3 or otherwise
> > is going to need to process RI correctly (whehter empty or not,
> > but especially if not because otherwise it can't renegotiate at all).
> > The only reason to send SCSV is if you're afraid to send RI because
> > you think an unupgraded server might break on it. 
> 
> My understanding of this draft is that it does NOT require upgraded SSL 3.0
> servers to understand any extensions in _initial_ handshakes.  An SSL 3.0
> server that ignores all handshakes (per the "draft-02" version of the 3.0
> spec), but understands SCSV, can be fully compliant with this draft.
> 
> I have come to expect that that will be the norm for upgraded SSL 3.0
> servers.  They will not, in general, understand any extensions in initial
> client hellos, and will only understand one extension in renegotiation
> client hellos, namely a non-empty RI.
> 
> Consistent with that expectation, I believe SCSV is the only reliable way to
> request renegotiation protection from upgraded SSL 3.0 servers.
> 
> Is that not the compromise we reached with Martin Rex?

I'm similarly confused.

The -03 document does not reflect WG consensus on the use of SCSV.

And the document is unnecessarily complicated and inconsistent.

OK:       3.3   "... the SCSV may be safely sent to any server."

OK:       3.4   "MUST include ... TLS_RENEGO_PROTECTION_REQUEST signal(l)ing
                cipher suite value in every ClientHello.

not good: 3.4   "MUST include and empty "renegotiation_info" extension
                 ... in every ClientHello"

          because the empty renegotiation_info applies only to
          ClientHellos of initial handshakes.

bad:      3.4   "Including both is not recommended."

          Working group consensus is that both may be included.

very bad: 3.5   "The SCSV MUST NOT be included."

          There is no working group consensus for this MUST NOT,
          and not a single technical argument for this MUST NOT
          has been given during the last 2 months.

Simply removing the two last mentioned sentences will
improve the document and reflect working group consensus.

-Martin

Re: [TLS] [mogul-open] Interoperability testing Martin Rex
Re: [TLS] [mogul-open] Interoperability testing Martin Rex