Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 09 July 2018 16:55 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2018 09:54:43 -0700
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To: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
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Thanks for writing this.

I would be in favor of deprecating old versions of TLS prior to 1.2.
Firefox Telemetry shows that about 1% of our connections are TLS 1.1 (on
the same data set, TLS 1.3 is > 5%), and TLS 1.1 is negligible.

This is probably a higher number than we'd be comfortable turning off
immediately, but it is probably worth starting the process.

-Ekr


On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Kathleen Moriarty <
kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hello,
>
> Stephen and I posted the draft below to see if the TLS working group
> is ready to take steps to deprecate TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.  There has
> been a recent drop off in usage for web applications due to the PCI
> Council recommendation to move off TLSv1.0, with a recommendation to
> go to TLSv1.2 by June 30th.  NIST has also been recommending TLSv1.2
> as a baseline.  Applications other than those using HTTP may not have
> had the same reduction in usage.  If you are responsible for services
> where you have a reasonable vantage point to gather and share
> statistics to assess usage further, that could be helpful for the
> discussion.  We've received some feedback that has been incorporated
> into the working draft and feelers in general have been positive.  It
> would be good to know if there are any show stoppers that have not
> been considered.
>
> https://github.com/sftcd/tls-oldversions-diediedie
>
> Thanks in advance,
> Kathleen
>
>
> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
> From:  <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
> Date: Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 3:05 PM
> Subject: New Version Notification for
> draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
> To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>ie>, Kathleen Moriarty
> <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
>
>
>
> A new version of I-D, draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Stephen Farrell and posted to the
> IETF repository.
>
> Name:           draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie
> Revision:       00
> Title:          Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
> Document date:  2018-06-18
> Group:          Individual Submission
> Pages:          10
> URL:
> https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-moriarty-tls-
> oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
> Status:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie/
> Htmlized:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00
> Htmlized:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-moriarty-tls-
> oldversions-diediedie
>
>
> Abstract:
>    This document [if approved] formally deprecates Transport Layer
>    Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
>    these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
>    for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
>    industry profiiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
>    these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
>    IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
>    away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions
>    increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
>    for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also requires
>    additional effort for library and product maintenance.
>
>    This document updates the backward compatibility sections of TLS RFCs
>    [[list TBD]] to prohibit fallback to TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.  This
>    document also updates RFC 7525.
>
>
>
>
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
> submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>
> The IETF Secretariat
>
>
>
> --
>
> Best regards,
> Kathleen
>
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