Re: [TLS] External PSK design team

Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com> Tue, 21 January 2020 10:49 UTC

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From: Jonathan Hoyland <jonathan.hoyland@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 10:49:42 +0000
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To: Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Cc: Björn Haase <bjoern.haase@endress.com>, Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] External PSK design team
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Hi All,

This is something I'm very interested in.

Definitely want to participate.

Regards,

Jonathan

On Tue, 21 Jan 2020 at 10:04, Mohit Sethi M <mohit.m.sethi=
40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> I would let CFRG deal with the PAKE selection process:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/cfrg/-a1sW3jK_5avmb98zmFbCNLmpAs
> and not have this design team spend time and energy on designing PAKEs.
>
> --Mohit
>
> On 1/21/20 11:52 AM, Björn Haase wrote:
> > Hello to all,
> >
> > I am also willing to contribute. My concern is that I observe that in
> some industrial control applications, PSK mechanisms (that actually require
> high-entropy keys) are (mis)-used in conjunction with TLS, where the PSK is
> actually of insufficient entropy (maybe derived only from a 4 digit PIN).
> >
> > In order to fix this issue, I'd really appreciate to have an PSK-style
> TLS operation using a balanced PAKE (note that this could be implemented
> with virtually no computational overhead in comparison to conventional ECDH
> session key generation).
> >
> > Yours,
> >
> > Björn.
> >
> >
> >
> > Mit freundlichen Grüßen I Best Regards
> >
> > Dr. Björn Haase
> >
> >
> > Senior Expert Electronics | TGREH Electronics Hardware
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> >
> > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> > Von: TLS <tls-bounces@ietf.org> Im Auftrag von Mohit Sethi M
> > Gesendet: Dienstag, 21. Januar 2020 10:45
> > An: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>; Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
> > Cc: TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
> > Betreff: Re: [TLS] External PSK design team
> >
> > I am certainly interested and willing to contribute. We need some
> > consensus on whether PSKs can be shared with more than 2 parties,
> > whether the parties can switch roles, etc.
> >
> > EMU is going to work on EAP-TLS-PSK and the question of
> > privacy/identities will pop-up there too.
> >
> > --Mohit
> >
> > On 1/21/20 7:33 AM, Colm MacCárthaigh wrote:
> >> Interested, as it happens - this is something I've been working on at
> Amazon.
> >>
> >> On Mon, Jan 20, 2020 at 8:01 PM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> >>> At IETF 106, we discussed forming a design team to focus on external
> PSK management and usage for TLS. The goal of this team would be to produce
> a document that discusses considerations for using external PSKs, privacy
> concerns (and possible mitigations) for stable identities, and more
> developed mitigations for deployment problems such as Selfie. If you have
> an interest in participating on this design team, please reply to this
> message and state so by 2359 UTC 31 January 2020.
> >>>
> >>> Cheers,
> >>>
> >>> Joe and Sean
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> TLS mailing list
> >>> TLS@ietf.org
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