Re: [TLS] An SCSV to stop TLS fallback.

Hi,

goo idea.

Another idea is to disable TLS-version pinning on the all servers until all
servers are upgraded to 1.3 and
 then enable TLS version pinning again.

Lets assume the client has TLS 1.2 pinned and the admin wants to upgrade to
TLS 1.3.

While pinning is disabled (short period of time) all clients who have
already pinned the TLS 1.2 will connect to TLS 1.3 put not pin TLS 1.3.
This way the clients can connect to other servers in the cluster that are
still running on TLS 1.2. Once all servers have been upgraded the admin can
turn on pinning again and on next connect the client will update the min.
allowed TLS version to 1.3 (or whatever the highest supported version by
the client is).

regards,

ralf

On Sat, Dec 7, 2013 at 3:33 PM, Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <mpg@elzevir.fr>wrote:

> Hi,
>
> On 07/12/2013 16:02, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
> > No, AFAIU the problem does not exist for cert pinning, because there is
> > protocol involved. Specifically, the server sends out HTTP headers to
> > indicate the pinning and its lifetime. So (for example) you can start by
> > changing the certs on all cluster members and only afterwards enable
> > pinning on all of them.
> >
> Maybe I'm missing something obvious, but it seems to me the problem with
> version
> pinning could be solved by explicitly stating the minimum TLS version in
> the
> HTTP headers, then. That way, cluster admins could upgrade some servers to
> say
> 1.3 while keeping the pinning on 1.2, and then update the pinning to 1.3
> only
> when all the servers in the cluster are upgraded to 1.3.
>
> Manuel.
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