Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0
Robert Cragie <robert.cragie@gridmerge.com> Tue, 21 May 2013 07:05 UTC
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Date: Tue, 21 May 2013 08:05:20 +0100
From: Robert Cragie <robert.cragie@gridmerge.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0
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+1. TLS 1.2 also opens up use of the AEAD ciphers. Robert On 20/05/2013 22:43, Paul Duffy wrote: > Hi Ulrich > > IMO mandate TLS 1.2 (as SEP2 did). > > For all of the reasons you mentioned below. > > With OpenADR, we are talking about an app that impacts the electric grid. > > Cheers > > > > On 5/20/2013 4:47 PM, Ulrich Herberg wrote: >> Hi, >> >> I have not followed this WG, so please forgive me if a similar >> question has already been discussed. >> >> I am participating in another SDO on a standard for automated Demand >> Response, called OpenADR (www.openadr.org), an application for the >> smart grid. The application is basically a web service, exchanging XML >> over HTTP over public networks, and using TLS (with RSA and ECDSA / >> SHA1 ciphers for TLS 1.0 and SHA2 for TLS1.2). Currently, the draft >> allows for TLS1.0 and 1.1, but recommends using 1.2 (and requires >> vendors to provide a migration plan in case TLS1.0 is obsoleted) . >> TLS1.0 and 1.1 RFCs have been obsoleted by the IETF; but I am not sure >> about the best current practice. Is it absolutely discouraged to use >> them? The argument in the OpenADR alliance is that many libraries and >> programming languages do not support TLS1.2, so they recommend to >> start the handshake with 1.2 and then downgrade - if required - to >> 1.0. I read that NIST disallows SHA1 after 2013; which would also >> affect TLS1.0, which does not support SHA2. >> >> What would be your recommendation in this case? Mandate TLS1.2 and >> disallow TLS1.0? Or just strongly recommend ("SHOULD") to use TLS1.2 >> and SHA2 ciphers, and otherwise to use TLS1.0? >> >> Best regards >> Ulrich >> _______________________________________________ >> TLS mailing list >> TLS@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >> > > _______________________________________________ > TLS mailing list > TLS@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls >
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Paul Duffy
- [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Ulrich Herberg
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Robert Cragie
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 David McGrew (mcgrew)
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Paterson, Kenny
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Ulrich Herberg
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Xiaoyong Wu
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Ulrich Herberg
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Ulrich Herberg
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Geoffrey Keating
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Kemp, David P.
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] TLS1.2 vs TLS1.0 Simon Josefsson