Re: [TLS] Strawman on EdDSA/Ed25519 in TLS

Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com> Fri, 22 May 2015 02:42 UTC

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Date: Thu, 21 May 2015 19:42:53 -0700
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From: Peter Bowen <pzbowen@gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Cc: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Strawman on EdDSA/Ed25519 in TLS
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On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 12:07 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>; wrote:
> On Wed, May 20, 2015 at 07:14:47PM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote:
>> Support for EdDSA/Ed25519 in TLS has been suggested a couple of times.
>
> I'm in favor.
>
>> One aspect I'm aware of is that there is no OID allocated nor
>> specification of PKIX certificates with EdDSA/Ed25519 public keys.  I'm
>> not sure the above document is the right place for doing that though,
>> and more thinking around this topic is especially appreciated.
>
> It's an OID.  You can get your own OID arc and then allocate an OID.
>
> Is it important to separate the addition of a PKIX algorithm OID from
> the TLS bits?  Well, it is neater that way.

I'll donate a short OID to the cause if that will help move things
forward.  We have the 1.3.187 arc which is only three bytes DER.  If
someone has a smaller arc (third node would be 127 or lower) and would
offer an OID from their arc we can shave off another couple of bytes.