Re: [TLS] Issue 49: Finished.verify length

At Fri, 14 Sep 2007 11:08:53 +0200,
Bodo Moeller wrote:
> > As I recall, the truncation was intended to *increase* security,
> > because it leaked less information about the MS to an active
> > attacker.
> 
> I am not convinced that this is a good reason.  Assume that the
> adversary tricks the parties into using weak encryption with some
> non-ephemeral key exchange, say.  Then not only the verify_data will
> be potentially visible to the adversary, but also the record-layer MAC
> will be exposed, which can be a lot of additional data (both depending
> on the master secret).

Me neither, BTW. I just seem to recall that that was the reason :)

-Ekr

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