Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2
Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 04 January 2018 22:29 UTC
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2018 09:29:11 +1100
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To: =?UTF-8?Q?Mateusz_Jo=C5=84czyk?= <mat.jonczyk@o2.pl>
Cc: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>,
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Subject: Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2
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On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 3:39 AM, Mateusz Jończyk <mat.jonczyk@o2.pl> wrote: > W dniu 04.01.2018 o 16:52, Stephen Farrell pisze: >> I'm fairly sure I'm against attempting to handle captive portal issues at >> the TLS layer. Any changes to TLS needed for captive portals ought really >> garner consensus within the capport wg and then be discussed here. (It >> looks from the archive of that wg that this topic hasn't even been raised >> there despite a few people suggesting that, which is IMO another reason to >> reject this proposal now.) > > Captive portals != filtering, these are AFAIK different problems and need > mostly different solutions. I just integrated them under the same umbrella > because they initially both used to seem to benefit from adding alert messages > to TLS (but that idea is dead now). > > I am not certain whether adding captive_portal AlertDescription to TLS would > be of benefit. It seems to me that possibly yes, but haven't reviewed this. Please take that discussion to the capport WG (captive-portals@ietf.org). However, it seems like you want to address filtering/censorship more than you want to address the captive portal case. I can say that the capport WG isn't interested in anything that might improve filtering or censorship and are explicitly designing mechanisms that avoid doing so. I won't say that you can't raise the issue, but you should be aware that this topic has been discussed quite a bit already and unless you have new information, I doubt you will change the conclusions.
- [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Mateusz Jończyk
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] access_administratively_disabled v2 Sean Turner