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Re: [TLS] Comments/Questions on draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-00.txt

Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> Wed, 25 September 2013 19:01 UTC

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Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 21:00:41 +0200
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From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Comments/Questions on draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-00.txt
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> Organizations often enforce weird and misguided policies on their users,
> e.g. forcing them all to use IE6 so that "legacy applications" do not need
> to be upgraded. Mind you, those older browsers only speak older SSL/TLS
> versions and *their* connections will still go through! Employing such
> middleboxes is just another policy of this type. Is it really our business
> to counteract the organization's policy?
>

Certainly, because we don't know if "the organization" that's trying to
downgrade your connection are your local network admins, or a foreign
government agency.  This doesn't mean there couldn't be a knob allowing you
(or your admins) to disable the security check, but the protocol should
have means to detect this kind of problem.

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