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Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3

Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> Fri, 16 January 2015 15:58 UTC

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Date: Fri, 16 Jan 2015 16:58:36 +0100
From: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Inclusion of OCB mode in TLS 1.3
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Hi,

I came up with the following list of cipher-suites applicable to >= TLS 1.2:

(EC)DHE:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_OCB	
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_OCB
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_OCB
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_OCB
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_OCB
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_OCB

PSK:
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_OCB
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_OCB	
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_OCB
TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_OCB

As for the nonce, would it make sense to use a 128bit nonce for both
AES128 and AES256 instead of 64/128 (see:
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/05/25/strengthmatching.html)?

What about SRP? Gone in 1.3? I tend to like SRP although it's rarely used.

Any objections, additions and/or comments?

Aaron

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