Re: [TLS] Fwd: Summary of today's discussion on server-side signing

I am ok with whatever the WG decides, particularly when the reasons are
non-cryptographic but rather based on implementation considerations.

Still, for the record, I'd like to correct the statement "

KnownConfiguration is only useful with 0-RTT.
".

KnownConfiguration could be used with 1-RTT even if the client does not
send early application data in the first flight.
This would have allowed to save a signature also in the 1-RTT case whenever
the client has cached a KnownConfiguration.
Saving a signature is a major performance benefit with RSA signatures (are
they really going away soon?) but is a benefit also with ECDSA as it avoids
the need to send a certificate chain (shortening the handshake) and the
need to verify these certificates. ECDSA also has a cost for the client.

Lastly, the protocol would be secure without the signature (in the case the
client uses a known configuration), a property that enables the use of the
protocol with offline signatures (to-be-specified).

Hugo

On Mon, Jul 27, 2015 at 7:26 AM, Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com> wrote:

> All,
>
> I asked ekr to write a brief summary of the server-side signing issue.
> The summary provided matches the WG consensus as judged by the chairs.
> Please let us know if you object to the way forward by August 3rd.
>
> J&S
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> > From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
> > Subject: Summary of today's discussion on server-side signing
> > Date: July 22, 2015 at 08:52:31 EDT
> > To: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>
> >
> > Sean,
> >
> > Here's a summary of today's discussion on signing and KnownConfiguration.
> >
> > SUMMARY
> > The WG agreed that the server must sign whenever certificate
> authentication
> > is used (even if the KnownConfiguration is used).
> >
> >
> > BACKGROUND
> > The current draft requires the server to send a
> Certificate/CertificateVerify
> > whenever either:
> >
> > (a) The KnownConfiguration option is not in use.
> > (b) The server sends a ServerConfiguration
> >
> > but it does not need to sign if the KnownConfiguration option is in
> > use but no new ServerConfiguration is provided.  Several people (most
> > recently Martin Thomson) have suggested that it would be simpler to
> > just require the server to sign any time certificate-based
> > authentication is in use. The penalty for this is an extra sign/verify,
> > as shown in the following table:
> >
> > Scenario                           Client                   Server
> > ------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 1-RTT                  1 (EC)DHE + Verify         1 (EC)DHE + Sign
> >
> > 0-RTT (current,                 2 (EC)DHE                2 (EC)DHE
> >   no new config)
> >
> > 0-RTT (current,        2 (EC)DHE + Verify         2 (EC)DHE + Sign
> >   new config)
> >
> > 0-RTT (proposed)       2 (EC)DHE + Verify         2 (EC)DHE + Sign
> >
> >
> > So, the performance difference here is between line 2 and line 4,
> > since whenever you provide a new config (line 3) you have to sign
> > anyway. The benefit is that it makes the server side of the handshake
> > essentially identical in both 0-RTT and 1-RTT, which is nice from an
> > implementation and analysis perspective.
> >
> >
> > SUMMARY OF WG DISCUSSION
> > During the WG discussion today, there was rough consensus to adopt
> > this change (i.e., always sign). A number of arguments were advanced
> > in favor of this change.
> >
> > (1) It's significantly simpler for implementors and (at least informal)
> >     analysis. A side benefit is being able to merge the extension
> >     logic for 0-RTT and KnownConfiguration, since
> 
> KnownConfiguration
> >     is only useful with 0-RTT.
> >
> > (2) It extends the properties we were shooting for with online-only
> >     signatures and requiring that the server always sign
> ServerConfiguration,
> >     namely continuous proof of access to the signing key.
> >
> > (3) The performance cost of an extra ECDSA signature is small and
> >     shrinking fast (per Ian Swett channelling Adam Langley), and
> >     people who care about speed will cut over to ECDSA (certs are
> >     readily available).
> >
> > (4) You can still do 0-RTT with PSK resumption, which is computationally
> >     much faster.
> >
> > On balance the WG seemed to feel that these were more compelling than
> > the performance value of the optimization.
> >
> > There was also a recognition that signature amortization was valuable,
> > but the consensus was that instead of doing this here, it would be
> > better to adopt Hugo's suggeston from a while back to have a
> > certificate extension that allowed offline signatures. This allows
> > both amortization *and* delegation, while not constituting a threat
> > to existing TLS 1.2 implementations. We agreed that this could be
> > worked in in parallel but shouldn't hold up TLS 1.3.
> >
> > Per WG guidance, I'll be preparing a draft PR for this.
> >
> > -Ekr
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
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