[TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC5246 (6244)
RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Wed, 29 July 2020 10:00 UTC
Return-Path: <wwwrun@rfc-editor.org>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 381B73A0645 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 03:00:24 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 5AYJe4rCEDft for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 03:00:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from rfc-editor.org (rfc-editor.org [4.31.198.49]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5FA4F3A05A7 for <tls@ietf.org>; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 03:00:22 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by rfc-editor.org (Postfix, from userid 30) id E09D1F4074D; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 02:59:55 -0700 (PDT)
To: tim@dierks.org, ekr@rtfm.com, rdd@cert.org, kaduk@mit.edu, caw@heapingbits.net, joe@salowey.net, sean+ietf@sn3rd.com
X-PHP-Originating-Script: 30:errata_mail_lib.php
From: RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Cc: voip.isdn@gmail.com, tls@ietf.org, rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"
Message-Id: <20200729095955.E09D1F4074D@rfc-editor.org>
Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 02:59:55 -0700
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/B1Th1gzOLcIrEoLF0spzeiWkA-Q>
Subject: [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC5246 (6244)
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 10:00:25 -0000
The following errata report has been submitted for RFC5246, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2". -------------------------------------- You may review the report below and at: https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6244 -------------------------------------- Type: Editorial Reported by: Victor S. Osipov <voip.isdn@gmail.com> Section: 6.2.3.2 Original Text ------------- IV The Initialization Vector (IV) SHOULD be chosen at random, and MUST be unpredictable. Note that in versions of TLS prior to 1.1, there was no IV field, and the last ciphertext block of the previous record (the "CBC residue") was used as the IV. This was changed to prevent the attacks described in [CBCATT]. For block ciphers, the IV length is of length SecurityParameters.record_iv_length, which is equal to the SecurityParameters.block_size. Corrected Text -------------- IV The Initialization Vector (IV) SHOULD be chosen at random, and MUST be unpredictable. Note that in versions of TLS prior to 1.1, there was no IV field, and the last ciphertext block of the previous record (the "CBC residue") was used as the IV. This was changed to prevent the attacks described in [CBCATT]. For block ciphers, the IV length is of length SecurityParameters.record_iv_length, which is equal to the SecurityParameters.block_length. Notes ----- This is an error here. The structure SecurityParameters hasn't the element block_size. It has the element block_length. See in section 6.1: struct { ConnectionEnd entity; PRFAlgorithm prf_algorithm; BulkCipherAlgorithm bulk_cipher_algorithm; CipherType cipher_type; uint8 enc_key_length; uint8 block_length; uint8 fixed_iv_length; uint8 record_iv_length; MACAlgorithm mac_algorithm; uint8 mac_length; uint8 mac_key_length; CompressionMethod compression_algorithm; opaque master_secret[48]; opaque client_random[32]; opaque server_random[32]; } SecurityParameters; Instructions: ------------- This erratum is currently posted as "Reported". If necessary, please use "Reply All" to discuss whether it should be verified or rejected. When a decision is reached, the verifying party can log in to change the status and edit the report, if necessary. -------------------------------------- RFC5246 (draft-ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis-10) -------------------------------------- Title : The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 Publication Date : August 2008 Author(s) : T. Dierks, E. Rescorla Category : PROPOSED STANDARD Source : Transport Layer Security Area : Security Stream : IETF Verifying Party : IESG
- [TLS] [Editorial Errata Reported] RFC5246 (6244) RFC Errata System