[TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks

Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com> Mon, 22 July 2024 19:34 UTC

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Date: Mon, 22 Jul 2024 22:28:24 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: [TLS]Re: Trust Anchor Negotiation Surveillance Concerns and Risks
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On Mon, Jul 22, 2024 at 11:27:37AM -0700, Dennis Jackson wrote:
> On 22/07/2024 11:00, Mike Shaver wrote:
> 
> For example, Trust Anchors requires the TLS Library to have access to
> additional DNS records, which either the application needs to provide or the
> TLS Library needs to fetch itself - neither seem viable by default. Both
> drafts also require other breaking API changes on client and server.

Yeah, access to DNS records is very problematic. And retrying handshake
is something even more problematic.

I don't see TE requiring breaking API changes on client: API that lets
one add a set of (pseudo) trust anchors plus TE advertisement for those
should work?

Server-side both require much more extensive API changes. However, I
think that it is feasible to add support without breaking API changes
(by extending certificate loading to support alternate issuer chains
[1]).


[1] Or if TLS library has reified issuers (however, I do not know any
stable TLS library that does), extending those to support alternate
chains. If TLS library does file parsing, one might even not need
any API changes.




-Ilari