Re: [TLS] EU cards

Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com> Fri, 29 July 2011 16:21 UTC

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Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2011 18:20:59 +0200
From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards
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On 2011-07-29 16:59, Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL wrote:
> In general I'd disagree - but you've made an excellent point about innovation on PC being dead (and therefore no chance to properly secure them while keeping 'em usable). US DoD is moving along the "secure 'em" axis, thus making usability suffer (many reasons for that). Thus many bitching end-users (and some of them actually have reasons to). But overall - comparing what CAC were expected to do with what they actually do - I'd call it a success because they _work_, like it or not. (Now OS changes version and fragile middleware quits, some readers aren't supported, etc - overall not a pleasant picture, but the infrastructure is fine and the capabilities are right.)

It is a bit unfair comparing an "enterprise" infrastructure that cost huge sums to raise and maintain, with a consumer/citizen scheme lacking any kind of serious client support.

As I said, NSTIC will (if actually carried out beyond the policy-definition stage), find that it is a difficult world out there.  Having worked for a major token vendor I know the drill: "whatever we
do, we must avoid commoditization".  This industry have succeed with their to the extent that they will be quite vulnerable to what Google and Apple are doing.  Even the venerable SIM-card is slated
for extinction.

Embedded rocks!

The USG as a buyer of technology isn't always an indication of were things are going:
http://us.blackberry.com/ataglance/security/products/smartcardreader

$200 for an inconvenient card reader!   Their hope is that this will be the standard.  Not chance in h***.

/Anders

>
> --
> Regards,
> Uri
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren@telia.com]
> Sent: Friday, July 29, 2011 01:07 AM
> To: Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL
> Cc: 'tls@ietf.org'; <tls@ietf.org>;
> Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards
>
> On 2011-07-28 21:42, Blumenthal, Uri - 0668 - MITLL wrote:
>> Anders,
>>
>> Where is your data on government cards usage coming from?
> various mailing lists such as:
> http://www.opensc-project.org/opensc
>
> Most of the people hanging out there are in some way working with the EU cards.
>
>> In US a lot (literally millions) of government email and Web access 
>> is secured by what you call "government cards".
> I guess you refer to PIV and CAC?
> There is a fundamental difference between the US and the EU and that
> only in the EU there is something called "citizen-cards" or eID.
>
> Citizens are supposed to buy eID for carrying out secure services on
> the Internet.  The cost have been high; results have been marginal
> for the reasons I listed (and some more...).
>
> Obama's NSTIC is something similar (but still very different) that
> will be slightly interesting following although I don't think
> their NIST friends really understand the consumer market and
> the huge technical issues they will have to deal with.
>
> IMO, the PC platform is dead as a vehicle for innovation; they
> might go to phones from the start.  I never understood why
> you need a picture on a token for Internet access :-)
>
> Well, "it has always been like that" is probably the [lame] excuse.
>
> Regards,
> Anders
>
>> --
>> Regards,
>> Uri
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren@telia.com]
>> Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2011 03:10 PM
>> To: Henry Story <henry.story@bblfish.net>;
>> Cc: S.tefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu>;; Martin Gaedke <martin.gaedke@informatik.tu-chemnitz.de>;; tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>;
>> Subject: Re: [TLS] EU cards
>>
>> Dropping HTTPS CCA, it will never leave the 0.1% slot anyway so
>> why would the browser vendor bother about how it works?
>>
>> Now to the cards: Since
>> 1. readers is a non-standard item
>> 2. all cards need different middleware
>> 3. cannot be fitted with additional certificates
>> 4. is generally only trusted by a restricted group
>> 5. commercial CAs require certified RP SW, contracts
>> this is simply put entirely uninteresting
>>
>> The government cards are status projects.  We have issued
>> x millions cards.  That they are only used as physical ID-cards
>> is something they are slightly less open about...
>>
>> Banks in Scandinavia put eID on credit-cards which means that
>> every merchant get your SSN as well (if they want).
>>
>> As I say all the time: Google and Apple will make all EU cards look
>> like they always was: A pile of s--t.
>>
>> Anders
>>
>> On 2011-07-28 17:07, Henry Story wrote:
>>> Hi Peter,
>>>
>>>  You may want to ask Prof. Martin Gaedke about this. He is working his way through the 
>>> EU area on this and should have some good pointers on where these token cards are 
>>> going around here. 
>>>
>>>    Henry
>>>
>>> On 28 Jul 2011, at 16:45, Peter Gutmann wrote:
>>>
>>>> Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@restena.lu>; writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Banking: These days, TAN lists are going away.
>>>> Is there any information on what's being done in countries like France, Italy,
>>>> the Netherlands, Spain, ...?  The only place where it's really documented (in
>>>> quite some detail) is Germany (with surrounding/similar countries like Austria
>>>> and Switzerland using equivalent approaches), but what are other countries in
>>>> Europe doing?  There's rather little information *from third parties, not the
>>>> vendors* publicly available on how e-banking is done in France, Spain, ...,
>>>> the pros and cons, how it deals with new attack types, and so on.
>>>>
>>>>> a) cell phone transaction numbers:
>>>> The problem is that mTANs are vulnerable to smartphone malware, as Zeus has
>>>> already shown.  It's currently a minor threat, but who knows how far the bad
>>>> guys will take it.  On the whole though mTANs are a nice tradeoff, you get to
>>>> verify the transaction over an independent channel, and the mTAN is a
>>>> cryptographic hash over the transaction data so if a MITB tries to modify what
>>>> the browser sends it gets detected.
>>>>
>>>> Peter.
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> TLS mailing list
>>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>> Social Web Architect
>>> http://bblfish.net/
>>>
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