IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Tue, 24 October 2017 19:32 UTC

Return-Path: <rsalz@akamai.com>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 67AA013F827 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 12:32:43 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.701
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.701 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW=-0.7, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=akamai.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id EaJvC9yNYbT8 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 12:32:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mx0a-00190b01.pphosted.com (mx0a-00190b01.pphosted.com [IPv6:2620:100:9001:583::1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6332A13F823 for <tls@ietf.org>; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 12:32:42 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from pps.filterd (m0050093.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by m0050093.ppops.net-00190b01. (8.16.0.21/8.16.0.21) with SMTP id v9OJVeLg028230; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 20:32:39 +0100
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=akamai.com; h=from : to : cc : subject : date : message-id : references : in-reply-to : content-type : content-id : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=jan2016.eng; bh=XMKckBZLl1y4soJgj2Twh+9NyKXp0lJa7EBuPHU5lXI=; b=F2HzDTSNamW8bq6FBh29WQAFrcKckNJZKGWXEUetEJlkih1NfoVQyJ/aC2fgRCeKT/aD Dz38ctEtGUSmSfua7fhA2ueqECKD9ob4Z+5g2+FY+TBscMDS2pTdyI/EVtWuU5hulcjW KFOHJGBJ1OmSpQOrTsGzce22W0GUYwsTDtaiFtjUkDDKRHpnMu0eQTwoRWUNEiZ1DJ8f 827rJ1lgcdo/MvWcSkLyiU3KQDEMnxyglKV7nksTQ9x42w/m5UsEUssuDoiwiDXKiKeD gUo4d1utcvDLsQ2Vl/MHUwECsIr7/ayXpPU7T9SCXxFYPOYeAx/2f4F1/PEZuchHVCJ0 6A==
Received: from prod-mail-ppoint1 (prod-mail-ppoint1.akamai.com [184.51.33.18]) by m0050093.ppops.net-00190b01. with ESMTP id 2dqwgkuamf-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 24 Oct 2017 20:32:39 +0100
Received: from pps.filterd (prod-mail-ppoint1.akamai.com [127.0.0.1]) by prod-mail-ppoint1.akamai.com (8.16.0.21/8.16.0.21) with SMTP id v9OJURh8018523; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 15:32:38 -0400
Received: from email.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.123.57]) by prod-mail-ppoint1.akamai.com with ESMTP id 2dr1juhxch-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Tue, 24 Oct 2017 15:32:38 -0400
Received: from USMA1EX-DAG1MB1.msg.corp.akamai.com (172.27.123.101) by usma1ex-dag1mb2.msg.corp.akamai.com (172.27.123.102) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 15.0.1263.5; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 15:32:37 -0400
Received: from USMA1EX-DAG1MB1.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.123.101]) by usma1ex-dag1mb1.msg.corp.akamai.com ([172.27.123.101]) with mapi id 15.00.1263.000; Tue, 24 Oct 2017 15:32:37 -0400
From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Ralph Droms <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>
CC: "David A. Cooper" <david.cooper@nist.gov>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
Thread-Index: AQHTTPr5Mz3yJYxp1UWiK0P85Z38q6LzpCgAgAABKgCAAAF3AA==
Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 19:32:36 +0000
Message-ID: <9E9C2714-D708-4291-A7E2-64278C10E697@akamai.com>
References: <cde0e322-797c-56e8-8c8d-655248ed7974@nist.gov> <FB95CAC8-C967-4724-90FB-B7E609DADF45@akamai.com> <8A5E441B-90B7-4DF4-BD45-7A33C165691B@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <8A5E441B-90B7-4DF4-BD45-7A33C165691B@gmail.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
user-agent: Microsoft-MacOutlook/f.27.0.171010
x-ms-exchange-messagesentrepresentingtype: 1
x-ms-exchange-transport-fromentityheader: Hosted
x-originating-ip: [172.19.33.119]
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Content-ID: <7C6CE768190DCF46874BAE82B96A5A7F@akamai.com>
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2017-10-24_10:, , signatures=0
X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1707230000 definitions=main-1710240267
X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2017-10-24_10:, , signatures=0
X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1707230000 definitions=main-1710240268
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/BDoq1uvrvszvnMaMpWYJXt_AwdA>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2017 19:32:43 -0000

➢ Just to make sure I understand, in this scenario the special-purpose browser could just as easily, today, be a browser with no TLS at all?   That is, I don't see why this scenario is specific to the visibility extension.
    
Because you can’t do that with TLS right now.  This adds that ability.   The idea of having a plaintext signal that allows intermediaries to force users into weakening their security seems to go against the very grain of what TLS tries to do.

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email