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Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Sun, 11 May 2014 01:07 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Sat, 10 May 2014 19:53:37 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
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>> The solution to avoid accidental use of NULL ciphers is in the client 
>> API, no client HELLO should ever include a mixture of NULL and 
>> non-NULL ciphers-suites.

> Why not make that a MUST in the RFC, and the same for anonymous DH?
> I think this solves most of the configuration issues without making any uses impossible.

This seems like a good way forward.

Russ

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