Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 updates from Chrome

Hanno Böck <> Sun, 14 October 2018 08:38 UTC

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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 updates from Chrome
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Thanks for that interesting explanation.

I just learned about another TLS 1.3 "intolerance" issue that people
deploying it should be aware of: It seems some servers don't consider
TLS 1.3 cipher suites as "safe" for HTTP/2 and this breaks connections:

While HTTP/2 is not necessarily the focus of this group I wonder what
that means, how HTTP/2 implementations should be made future proof and
if there can be a GREASE-like mechanism for it.
Whitelisting "safe" ciphers seems to be a bad idea and almost
inevitably will lead to more trouble in the future.

Hanno Böck

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