Re: [TLS] NULL cipher to become a MUST NOT in UTA BCP

[Ralph Holz <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

>>> What is much more reasonable is that initiators (clients) should 
>>> refuse to negotiate (should suppress any configured) NULL cipher 
>>> suites when any non NULL cipher suite is enabled.  This prevents 
>>> accidents, without breaking carefully considered NULL to NULL 
>>> deployments.
>>> 
>>> It leaves room for dual-purpose servers.
>> 
>> I am opposed to such a definition - I think it would a) be too hard
>> to describe the rationale and why it should apply b) lead to
>> insecure configurations because there is Yet Another Cornercase We
>> Didn't Think Of and c) is better caught with a refined purpose
>> statement/statement of applicability.

[...]

> As for “too hard to describe” - you don’t need to dive into rationale
> of “why the user may want to apply this protection, or disable that
> one”. Just clearly state in layman’s terms what a given protection -
> and its lack - would result in. Then there would be no corner cases.

I think such a description can be added as half a section/page. Would
you be willing to contribute it?

Ralph

-- 
Ralph Holz
I8 - Network Architectures and Services
Technische Universität München
http://www.net.in.tum.de/de/mitarbeiter/holz/
Phone [phone]
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