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Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated headers (was Re: Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?)

Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> Tue, 01 December 2015 20:49 UTC

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Date: Tue, 01 Dec 2015 23:49:13 +0300
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From: Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com>
To: Bryan A Ford <brynosaurus@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fully encrypted and authenticated headers (was Re: Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?)
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Dear Bryan,

On Tue, Dec 1, 2015 at 7:22 PM, Bryan A Ford <brynosaurus@gmail.com> wrote:

DTLS:
>
> Now there's still the important question of whether this (new) proposal
> could be made to work in the context of DTLS.  For the DTLS case, my
> current thinking is that some elements of my earlier proposal is
> probably more suitable: namely using a stream cipher (or AEAD used as a
> stream cipher) to encrypt and recognize the explicitly-transmitted
> sequence numbers that DTLS needs.  This could operate basically the same
> as I described in my earlier E-mail on this topic.  Note that the length
> field is no longer a problem in DTLS as it is in TLS, because the
> receiver already gets the length of the datagram from UDP.
>
>
Do I understand correctly that your propose makes difficult to derive the
key from the original value depending on the sequence number?

-- 
SY, Dmitry Belyavsky

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