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Re: [TLS] Awkward Handshake: Possible mismatch of client/server view on client authentication in post-handshake mode in Revision 18

Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com> Fri, 10 February 2017 20:44 UTC

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From: Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2017 15:44:35 -0500
Message-ID: <CAAZdMadhr6r160A50x=DzMHEvsSN0x9dUcpOzBOuXGcYzyR4oA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Awkward Handshake: Possible mismatch of client/server view on client authentication in post-handshake mode in Revision 18
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On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 3:39 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

> I agree that the specification doesn't explicitly say this, but
> it's implicit in the processing rules via the following:
>

We do at least explicitly promise those properties in Section E.2:

Order protection/non-replayability
: An attacker should not be able to cause the receiver to accept a
record which it has already accepted or cause the receiver to accept
record N+1 without having first processed record N.

  -- Victor.

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