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Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> Thu, 04 May 2017 20:24 UTC

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From: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
Date: Thu, 04 May 2017 13:24:30 -0700
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To: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT
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On Thu, May 4, 2017 at 12:12 PM, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org> wrote:

> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 11:13 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> 1. A SHOULD-level requirement for server-side 0-RTT defense, explaining
>> both session-cache and strike register styles and the merits of each.
>>
>
> I don't believe this is technically viable for the large-scale server
> operators most interested in 0-RTT.
>

I think it is (and work at one of the biggest) ... but if even it weren't,
that would just imply that we can't have 0-RTT at all, not that it's ok to
ship an insecure version.

-- 
Colm

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