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Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> Thu, 01 March 2018 19:16 UTC

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From: Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2018 14:16:13 -0500
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To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@dukhovni.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension@ietf.org, TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, tls-chairs <tls-chairs@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-06: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 6:36 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 11:24:31AM -0500, Shumon Huque wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 10:59 AM, Shumon Huque <shuque@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > Several of us were well aware of this during the early days of the
> > > draft, but perhaps many folks did not fully appreciate the impacts
> > > until I elaborated on them last year, and added text that described
> > > the "adversary with fraudulently obtained PKIX credentials" attack.
> >
> > Following up to my own message, sorry ..
> >
> > It occurred to me that perhaps a good way to mitigate this risk is
> > a combo of mechanisms like CAA and Certificate Transparency logs.
>
> NO.  That's insanely complicated.


Is it really?

We're talking about a scenario of incremental deployment of DANE in an
existing PKIX ecosystem. In such an environment, I would expect that
many servers will likely support both PKIX-only and DANE, at least
initially. So presumably they will already be paying attention to CT logs
to
detect mis-issuance. And even if they support only DANE, they might be
concerned about an attacker impersonating their service to DANE
unaware clients.

Shumon.

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