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Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Fri, 02 October 2015 19:44 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Fri, 02 Oct 2015 22:43:55 +0300
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed
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> On Oct 2, 2015, at 6:42 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 8:24 AM, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com <mailto:rsalz@akamai.com>> wrote:
> 
> > 1) We know CRIME threat, but it can not be risk for everyone.
> > e.g., CVSS v2 Base Score: 2.6 (LOW)
> 
> CVSS isn't always appropriate; CVSS2 called Heartbleed a 5; CVS v3 called it 7.5
> 
> > Which one is safer, "tls1.2" v.s. "tls1.3 with comp/decomp" ?
> 
> They are equivalent.  If you use AES-GCM and ECDHE, and you don't need 0RTT, then there is no compelling reason to use TLS 1.3.
> 
> I don't want to take a position on what's compelling or not, but there are a number of
> other reasons to use TLS 1.3, including support for real padding, encrypted content types,
> privacy for client authentication, etc.

And client certificate authentication in HTTP/2

(This assumes that HTTP/2 is required)

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