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From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 May 2025 14:06:50 +0400
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To: Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>
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Subject: =?utf-8?q?=5BTLS=5D_Re=3A_Working_Group_Last_Call_for_RFC8773bis?=
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On Tue, 13 May 2025 at 20:44, Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net> wrote:
>
> Russ has made modifications to the rfc8773bis and published a new draft [=
1] to address the comments from the FATT.  You can see the diffs with the p=
revious version are here: [2] and the FATT commentary from IETF 122 here: [=
3].
>
> This is a working group last call for this document.  If you believe this=
 document has sufficiently addressed the concerns please indicate so on thi=
s thread.  If you do not think it is sufficient please indicate what text m=
odifications would address your issue.  This call will remain open until Ma=
y 28, 2025.
>

In the security section,

While Grover=E2=80=99s algorithm (described in
   Section 7.1 of [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers]) allows a quantum
   computer to perform a brute force key search using quadratically
   fewer steps than would be required with classical computers, there
   are a number of mitigating factors suggesting that Grover=E2=80=99s algo=
rithm
   will not speed up brute force symmetric key search as dramatically as
   one might suspect

Isn't that section 2.1 of ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers instead of section 7.1 ?