Re: [TLS] Downgrade protection, fallbacks, and server time

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Thu, 02 June 2016 01:42 UTC

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Date: Thu, 2 Jun 2016 11:42:00 +1000
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Downgrade protection, fallbacks, and server time
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On 2 June 2016 at 08:56, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; wrote:
>> (Although, do we actually get the stronger protection if the client
>> accepts plain RSA key exchange? I've never been very clear on that.
>> Realistically, clients will be accepting plain RSA for a long while.)
>
>
> Yes, that's correct. I don't believe we have a good plan for plain RSA.

The best plan involves lots and lots of fire.