Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension

Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Tue, 26 July 2011 21:52 UTC

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Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2011 17:51:56 -0400
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From: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
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Cc: Philip Gladstone <pgladstone@cisco.com>, David McGrew <mcgrew@cisco.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS Proxy Server Extension
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On Tue, Jul 26, 2011 at 5:41 PM, Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>; wrote:
> Really?  I thought Chrome used the operating system TA store. How can it tell the difference between a trust anchor that was installed by Microsoft and one that was installed by the user?

Not in any very clean way I'm afraid:

http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src/net/base/x509_certificate_known_roots_win.h?revision=80765&view=markup

> But I know that the EV indication goes away behind a proxy, and there's no way to make your CA certificate "EV" to the browser. Dave's proposal allows the green label to come back.

I've poked BlueCoat at least about this problem in the past and they
didn't appear to be too exercised by it. It's really the MITM folks
who need to figure out if this address their needs or not. I simply
don't know the requirements in this space well enough to know if the
draft meets them. From my point of view, we keep MITM in the back of
our minds but otherwise mostly ignore them except to ban certain
troublesome vendors from time to time.


Cheers

AGL