Re: Antwort: [TLS] TLS 1.2 MAC calculation

Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> Fri, 03 August 2007 10:47 UTC

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Date: Fri, 03 Aug 2007 12:47:02 +0200
From: Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org>
To: Axel.Heider@gi-de.com
Subject: Re: Antwort: [TLS] TLS 1.2 MAC calculation
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On Fri, Aug 03, 2007 at 12:25:03PM +0200, Axel.Heider@gi-de.com wrote:

>> I just want to make sure I'm reading the spec
>> correctly.  Is SHA-256 used only for the PRF
>> calculation and the MAC algorithm is still
>> whatever the cipher suite says?  Or is SHA-
>> 256 also used for MAC calculations?  I believe
>> the former, so MD5 could even still be used
>> with RC4 -- is this correct?

> My opinion is, that for compatibility reasons, 
> all defined cipher suits sould work as before. 
> The SHA-256 versions of any cipher suits should 
> get a new id. This would also make the 
> implementation easier if all SSL/TLS versions 
> are supported.

Compatibility isn't really an important issue here (we have explicit
version negotiation).  Ease of implementation is.  Luckily, appendices
B and C make it quite clear that SHA still means SHA-1, and that MD5
still means MD5.  There's really nothing wrong with this: This use of
HMAC is for ephemeral authentication only, so there's no reason to
force everyone to live with the overhead of SHA-256 or something.

The situation is quite different for hashes in the PRF.  The PRF is
essential for the long-term security of encryption, and the old PRF is
somewhat weird; replacing it makes a lot of sense.

Bodo


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