Re: [TLS] Adoption call for draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1

Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org> Thu, 14 November 2019 22:43 UTC

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From: Adam Langley <agl@imperialviolet.org>
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 14:43:07 -0800
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Adoption call for draft-davidben-tls13-pkcs1
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On Mon, Nov 11, 2019 at 11:33 AM Christopher Wood <caw@heapingbits.net>;
wrote:

> The adoption call is now (belatedly) finished. At this time, there's not
> enough interest to take this on as a WG item. We encourage further
> discussion on the list, perhaps based on subsequent draft updates, and will
> revisit adoption in the future if interest grows.
>

People on this list who manage large corporate networks may wish to pay
attention to this: while you may not have updated servers to TLS 1.3 yet,
eventually it'll happen and I suspect some will find a significant amount
of things like TPMs, in which you currently have client-certificate keys,
which only sign with PKCS#1 v1.5. Without this draft adopted and
implemented ahead of time, it's going to be painful.


Cheers

AGL