Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Tue, 01 March 2016 18:38 UTC
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Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 18:38:17 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
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On Tue, Mar 01, 2016 at 10:26:35AM -0800, Watson Ladd wrote: > > And so (maybe not entirely coincidentally!): another attack, dubbed > > DROWN, just emerged¹, using SSLv2 as - you guessed it - a > > Bleichenbacher padding oracle against RSA PKCS#1 v1.5! > > PSS doesn't help against Bleichenbacher attacks on encryption. The attack > still can compute a private key operation. Yes, fortunately TLS 1.3 eliminates RSA key transport. Otherwise, for key transport we'd want OAEP rather than PSS. Still, even though DROWN does not attack RSA signatures, we cannot say that ongoing use of PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures is particularly wise. http://www.automatednetworkedstorage.biz/emc-plus/rsa-labs/historical/raising-standard-rsa-signatures-rsa-pss.htm Burt Kaliski, RSA Laboratories February 26, 2003 Executive Summary RSA-PSS is a new signature scheme that is based on the RSA cryptosystem and provides increased security assurance. It was added in version 2.1 of PKCS #1. While the traditional and widely deployed PKCS #1 v1.5 signature scheme is still appropriate to use, RSA Laboratories encourages a gradual transition to RSA-PSS as new applications are developed. So the question is how "gradual" we want the transition to be. If v1.5 is negotiable, in TLS 1.3, we're looking at another decade or two, perhaps by then QC will make RSA obsolete? -- Viktor.
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Benjamin Beurdouche
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Fedor Brunner
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hannes Mehnert
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is enou… Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is … Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is … Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri