[TLS] TLS 1.3 draft 13.

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Sun, 22 May 2016 19:46 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Sun, 22 May 2016 12:45:20 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] TLS 1.3 draft 13.
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Folks,

I just uploaded draft-13. Changelog appended at the bottom of this
message.

The following nontrivial issues are outstanding:

- How to encrypt post-handshake messages (post-handshake client auth,
  NewSessionTicket, etc.). I'm having a discussion now with the
  cryptographers about this.

- Allowing multiple session tickets in NewSessionTicket
  (https://github.com/tlswg/tls13-spec/pull/466). I think this is OK
  but please take a look.

- The rules for how closely extensions need to match in 0-RTT. I am
  starting to think that Ilari is right that the current "check
  everything for match" is too strict, so expect a new PR for this
  in the next few days.

I want to resolve these this week and then publish -14 soon after.

-Ekr

Changes:
- Allow server to send SupportedGroups.

- Remove 0-RTT client authentication

- Remove (EC)DHE 0-RTT.

- Flesh out 0-RTT PSK mode and shrink EarlyDataIndiation

- Turn PSK-resumption response into an index to save room

- Move CertificateStatus to an extension

- Extra fields in NewSessionTicket.

- Restructure key schedule and add a resumption_context value.

- Require DH public keys and secrets to be zero-padded to the size
  of the group.

- Remove the redundant length fields in KeyShareEntry.

- Define a cookie field for HRR.