Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS

Bill Cox <> Tue, 12 January 2016 20:12 UTC

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Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 12:12:39 -0800
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From: Bill Cox <>
To: Dave Garrett <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fixing TLS
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On Tue, Jan 12, 2016 at 11:39 AM, Dave Garrett <>

> On Tuesday, January 12, 2016 02:27:02 pm Bill Cox wrote:
> Personally, I hope this new version of TLS, save for possibly some minor
> update & extensions, is the final version. I hope that Google's efforts to
> get QUIC as-is specced out go quickly and smoothly, and that it can be used
> as a basis to develop an official total TCP/TLS replacement. (the early
> documentation for QUIC was horrible, but the current work is vastly
> improved) As far as I'm concerned, TLS 1.3 is a transitional measure which
> should only be used in the medium-term by those who adopt new tech very
> slowly, and in the long-term phased out entirely. It is a very important
> transitional measure that needs to be done with as high a security and
> performance as possible, but a finite one nonetheless. (well, arguably,
> pretty much everything is, given a long enough timeframe ;) We have to get
> through the short-term to get to the long-term, though.
> Dave

I wish that were the plan (to upgrade QUIC crypto and eventually make that
the new crypto platform).  If I am not mistaken, QUICK crypto is going to
be archived, TLS 1.3 will replace the crypto code, and QUIC will remain the
transport layer.  So, maybe long-term you folks could do a clean-slate TLS
2.0?  That would would be awesome, IMO.