[TLS] New Version Notification for draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Fri, 02 March 2018 21:00 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Fri, 02 Mar 2018 16:00:44 -0500
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Subject: [TLS] New Version Notification for draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
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A few minutes at the TLS WG session in London have been requested to talk about this draft.


> From: internet-drafts@ietf.org
> Subject: New Version Notification for draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
> Date: March 2, 2018 at 3:58:35 PM EST
> To: "Ralph Droms" <rdroms.ietf@gmail.com>, "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>
> A new version of I-D, draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
> has been successfully submitted by Ralph Droms and posted to the
> IETF repository.
> Name:		draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility
> Revision:	01
> Title:		TLS 1.3 Option for Negotiation of Visibility in the Datacenter
> Document date:	2018-03-02
> Group:		Individual Submission
> Pages:		11
> URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01.txt
> Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility/
> Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01
> Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01
> Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-01
> Abstract:
>   Current drafts of TLS 1.3 do not include the use of the RSA
>   handshake.  While (EC) Diffie-Hellman is in nearly all ways an
>   improvement over the TLS RSA handshake, the use of (EC)DH has impacts
>   certain enterprise network operational requirements.  The TLS
>   Visibility Extension addresses one of the impacts of (EC)DH through
>   an opt-in mechanism that allows a TLS client and server to explicitly
>   grant access to the TLS session plaintext.
> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
> The IETF Secretariat