[TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 28 September 2026 18:16 UTC

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Subject: [TLS] Re: Confirming PQ+T Signatures Consensus
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On Mon, Sep 28, 2026 at 9:53 AM Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> wrote:
> 
> At IETF 126, the chairs conducted a series of polls [1] to determine the way forward for PQ+T hybrid signatures after hearing from the -composite-mldsa [2] and -pqt-dual-certs [3] authors; you can watch the setup, authors presentations, and the polls at [4] from around 0:16:47 until 1:08:00. The polls' results showed in-room consensus to 1) work on PQ + T Signatures for TLS and 2) work only on -composite-mldsa. The chairs now need to confirm this consensus on list. We are going to do this by asking the four questions that follow. Please take note of the take note of the following:
> 
> 1. Framing of the questions is found in this deck [5]; in case it is/was not clear a "Yes" on Question 1 implies WG adoption of a draft.
> 2. Again, a "Yes" for 3 or 4 implies you are in favor of adopting the associated draft as a working group item.
> 3. Based on the responses we got during the session we only asked the 1st 4 questions in [5].
> 
> Please provide your answers to the following questions by 12 October 2026:
> 
> 1. Should the WG work on PQ + T Hybrid Signatures for TLS?

In my view, we don't need composite signatures for TLS, but I recognize that other people really want them or are required to support them.

> 2. Should the WG only work on one: -pqt-dual-certs or -composite-ml-dsa?

In my view, we only need one. Supporting both will lead to a bigger attack surface.

> 3. Should the WG work on: -pqt-dual-certs?

No.

> 4. Should the WG work on: -composite-ml-dsa?

Yes.

> 
> Cheers,
> spt (for the chairs)
> 
> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/polls-126-tls-202607241600/
> [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-reddy-tls-composite-mldsa/
> [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-yusef-tls-pqt-dual-certs/
> [4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qp1s1UMmhTI
> [5] https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/126/materials/slides-126-tls-framing-pq-t-signatures-for-tls-00
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