Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI (off-topic)
S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com> Sun, 18 May 2014 18:14 UTC
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Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 10:12:57 -0700
To: Michael Carbone <michael@accessnow.org>, tls@ietf.org
From: S Moonesamy <sm+ietf@elandsys.com>
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References: <5373C4F3.3010602@blah.is> <6.2.5.6.2.20140517075513.0bc6bfa8@resistor.net> <5377BE89.6000807@accessnow.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI (off-topic)
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Hi Michael, At 12:54 17-05-2014, Michael Carbone wrote: >I'm not exactly sure what you are suggesting, but that's why Access is >here -- to help highlight the importance of this proposal to the folks >who are actively involved in the discussion and consideration of >proposals for the specification. > >Waiting and assuming that an encrypted TLS handshake by default will >appear in the TLS 1.3 specification seems like a non-ideal approach, >given that without discussion, a proposed implementation, and support, >it will likely not get there. We recognize honing a proposed >implementation is a lot of work and we want to support those who are >currently discussing and drafting one. It is worthwhile, and the >real-world impact will be tangible. I agree that waiting and assuming that the outcome of a specification would be favorable is a non-ideal approach. >It's difficult for these communities to ensure their needs are taken >into account given that they are non-technical, unaware of the IETF, and >obviously not part of the process. We want to make sure such users are Yes. Although it might not be the intent the message came out as designing a TLS specification to bypass censorship for political reasons. There were two organizations [1] which posted comments along those lines. I suggested framing the comments as technical input and avoid the political advocacy angle. Note that I am okay with encrypting the SNI as the average user would expect that the information being sent can only read by the endpoint on the other side. Regards, S. Moonesamy 1. I am aware of how affiliation works in the IETF. I used the word in my explanation for clarity.
- [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Dan Blah
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Seth David Schoen
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Michael Carbone
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Fabrice
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Christian Huitema
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Robert Ransom
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Marsh Ray
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI (off-topic) S Moonesamy
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI (off-topic) Michael Carbone
- Re: [TLS] In support of encrypting SNI (off-topic) S Moonesamy