Re: [TLS] Iotdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04

Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com> Wed, 28 October 2020 03:32 UTC

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From: Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>
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Date: Tue, 27 Oct 2020 23:32:49 -0400
Cc: Daniel Migault <daniel.migault@ericsson.com>, iot-directorate@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate.all@ietf.org, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Iotdir last call review of draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
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> On Oct 27, 2020, at 10:32, Daniel Migault <mglt.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> To address the comment below, keeping weak security is likely to weaken current and future IoT communications, so I do not think there is room for compromise with performance. Of course this is in a context of TLS.  I expect protocol to leverage from TLS security, so the impact should be rather negligible. 
> 
> """
> As those hash algorithms were 'cheap' for TLS 1.2, I would appreciate a review of impacted IoT protocols if those algorithms are deprecated.
> """

In terms of process, are you suggesting "a review of impacted IoT protocols if those algorithms are deprecated” MUST be completed prior to advancing this document to the IESG?

spt

> Yours, 
> Daniel
> 
> 
> On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 10:21 AM Daniel Migault via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
> Reviewer: Daniel Migault
> Review result: Ready with Nits
> 
> Hi,
> 
> 
> I reviewed this document as part of the IoT Directorate's ongoing effort to
> review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These comments were
> written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors.  Document
> authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just like
> any other IETF Last Call comments.  
> 
> Review Results: Ready with Nits
> 
> Please find my comments below.
> 
> Yours,
> Daniel
> 
> 
>          Deprecating MD5 and SHA-1 signature hashes in TLS 1.2
>                   draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate-04
> [...]
> 
> 1.  Introduction
> 
>    The usage of MD5 and SHA-1 for signature hashing in TLS 1.2 is
>    specified in [RFC5246].  MD5 and SHA-1 have been proven to be
>    insecure, subject to collision attacks [Wang].  In 2011, [RFC6151]
>    detailed the security considerations, including collision attacks for
>    MD5.  NIST formally deprecated use of SHA-1 in 2011
>    [NISTSP800-131A-R2] and disallowed its use for digital signatures at
>    the end of 2013, based on both the Wang, et. al, attack and the
>    potential for brute-force attack.  In 2016, researchers from INRIA
>    identified a new class of transcript collision attacks on TLS (and
>    other protocols) that rely on efficient collision-finding algorithms
>    on the underlying hash constructions [Transcript-Collision].
>    Further, in 2017, researchers from Google and CWI Amsterdam
>    [SHA-1-Collision] proved SHA-1 collision attacks were practical.
>    This document updates [RFC5246] and [RFC7525] in such a way that MD5
>    and SHA-1 MUST NOT be used for digital signatures.  However, this
>    document does not deprecate SHA-1 in HMAC for record protection.
> 
> <mglt>
> RFC6194 may be mentioned as a reference for
> not deprecating HMAC-SHA-1 as well as an
> additional reference to [NISTSP800-131A-R2]. 
> 
> Reading the text the situation of HMAC with
> MD5 is unclear. Since we specify that SHA-1
> is not deprecated for HMAC we may specify
> the status for HMAC with MD5. Given RFC6151 I
> hope the reason is that MD5 and HMAC-MD5 has
> already been deprecated but I have not found
> this. Maybe that would worth mentioning it
> is deprecated already.
> 
> </mglt>
> 
> [...]
> 
> 2.  Signature Algorithms
> 
>    Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in the signature_algorithms
>    extension.  If a client does not send a signature_algorithms
>    extension, then the server MUST abort the handshake and send a
>    handshake_failure alert, except when digital signatures are not used
>    (for example, when using PSK ciphers).
> 
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that the server behavior might
> be defined as well. In our case this could be
> something around the lines the server MUST
> ignore MD5 and SHA1 values in the signature
> algorithm extension. 
> 
> </mglt>
> 
> 3.  Certificate Request
> 
>    Servers SHOULD NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateRequest
>    messages.
> 
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that the same level of
> authentication should be provided for both
> peers and that server MUST NOT  include MD5
> or SHA-1.
> 
> A SHOULD NOT status might be welcome for a
> smooth transition. At that time, collision
> for MD5 and SHA1 are known for years. It is likely
> that software that still need MD5 or SHA1 are
> likely to never upgrade, so I doubt a smooth
> path worth being taken. 
> </mglt>
> 
> 4.  Server Key Exchange
> 
>    Servers MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in ServerKeyExchange messages.
>    If a client receives a MD5 or SHA-1 signature in a ServerKeyExchange
>    message it MUST abort the connection with the illegal_parameter
>    alert.
> 
> <mglt>
> As per section 2, the client has clearly
> indicated it does not support signature with
> MD5/SHA1, so Server Key Exchange should not
> end up with signature with SHA1/MD5. 
> 
> """
> If the client has offered the "signature_algorithms" extension, the
>    signature algorithm and hash algorithm MUST be a pair listed in that
>    extension. 
> """
> 
> It also seems to me that the constraint of
> including a MD5 and SHA-1 signature is
> related to the Certificate. I suspect that
> some clarification are needed here.  
> 
> Since the case where the extension becomes
> mandatory, the quoted text above of RFC 5246
> might be updated as well, though this does
> not appear that necessary.
> 
> </mglt>
> 
> 5.  Certificate Verify
> 
>    Clients MUST NOT include MD5 and SHA-1 in CertificateVerify messages.
>    If a server receives a CertificateVerify message with MD5 or SHA-1 it
>    MUST abort the connection with handshake_failure or
>    insufficient_security alert.
> 
> 
> <mglt>
> 
> 6. Certificate 
> 
> Unless I am missing something, it seems to me
> that signature may also be found in the
> Certificate messages for the chain as well in
> the restriction of the signature algorithm.
> The end certificate is associated to the peer
> while other certificate are related to a CA. 
> 
> It seems that client and server behavior may
> be specified. The quoted text below may be
> helpful to clarify. 
> 
> """
>  If the client provided a "signature_algorithms" extension, then all
>    certificates provided by the server MUST be signed by a
>    hash/signature algorithm pair that appears in that extension.
> """
> 
> </mglt>
> 
> 6.  Updates to RFC5246
> 
>    [RFC5246], The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2,
>    suggests that implementations can assume support for MD5 and SHA-1 by
>    their peer.  This update changes the suggestion to assume support for
>    SHA-256 instead, due to MD5 and SHA-1 being deprecated.
> 
>    In Section 7.4.1.4.1: the text should be revised from:
> 
>    OLD:
> 
>    "Note: this is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports MD5 and SHA- 1."
> 
>    NEW:
> 
>    "Note: This is a change from TLS 1.1 where there are no explicit
>    rules, but as a practical matter one can assume that the peer
>    supports SHA-256."
> 
> 
> <mglt>
> I am reading the Note as an explanation on
> why sha was taken as the default hash
> function with the following rules. 
> 
> """
> If the client does not send the signature_algorithms extension, the
>    server MUST do the following:
> 
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (RSA, DHE_RSA,
>       DH_RSA, RSA_PSK, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_RSA), behave as if client had
>       sent the value {sha1,rsa}.
> 
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (DHE_DSS,
>       DH_DSS), behave as if the client had sent the value {sha1,dsa}.
> 
>    -  If the negotiated key exchange algorithm is one of (ECDH_ECDSA,
>       ECDHE_ECDSA), behave as if the client had sent value {sha1,ecdsa}.
> """
> 
> The current document does not update the
> default hash function from sha to sha256 to
> avoid interoperability issue where one peer
> takes sha while the other one takes sha-256.
> As a results, these rules and the "Note" may
> eventually all together be replaced by your
> text of section 2. 
> 
> The following text may also be removed:
> 
> """
>  If the client supports only the default hash and signature algorithms
>    (listed in this section), it MAY omit the signature_algorithms
>    extension.
> """
> 
> Regarding the Note, it seems to be that the
> removal of support for MD5/SHA1 will result
> in interoperability issues. At this point,
> the issue is due to the obsolescence of the
> implementation as deprecation of SHA1/Md5 has
> started a long time ago. 
> 
> It is unclear to me how normative is
> interpreted "can assume". Was the support of
> MD5/SHA1 a SHOULD or a MUST? In both case, if
> we were willing to maintain interoperability
> between software that only implemented
> MD5/SHA1, we should take a slower path and
> introducing SHA-256 and having were MD5/SHA1
> kept for interoperability purpose before
> being deprecated. I do not think we should
> take that path as implementations that
> currently do not support SHA-256 are unlikely
> to be updated and that deprecation of
> SHA1/MD5 has started a long time ago. 
> 
> I would however mention the issue of
> interoperability in the  section but not in
> the text to update. In the text to update I
> would maybe suggest that the support of
> SHA-256 comes with a normative MUST
> statement. 
> 
> 
> </mglt>
> 
> Velvindron, et al.       Expires April 12, 2021                 [Page 3]
> 
> Internet-Draft      draft-ietf-tls-md5-sha1-deprecate       October 2020
> 
> 
> 7.  Updates to RFC7525
> 
>    [RFC7525], Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security
>    (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) recommends use of
>    SHA-256 as a minimum requirement.  This update moves the minimum
>    recommendation to use stronger language deprecating use of both SHA-1
>    and MD5.  The prior text did not explicitly include MD5 or SHA-1; and
>    this text adds guidance to ensure that these algorithms have been
>    deprecated..
> 
>    Section 4.3:
> 
>    OLD:
> 
>    When using RSA, servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with
>    at least a 2048-bit modulus for the public key.  In addition, the use
>    of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED (see [CAB-Baseline] for
>    more details).  Clients SHOULD indicate to servers that they request
>    SHA-256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS
>    1.2.
> 
>    NEW:
> 
>    Servers SHOULD authenticate using certificates with at least a
>    2048-bit modulus for the public key.
> 
>    In addition, the use of the SHA-256 hash algorithm is RECOMMENDED;
>    and SHA-1 or MD5 MUST NOT be used (see [CAB-Baseline] for more
>    details).  Clients MUST indicate to servers that they request SHA-
>    256, by using the "Signature Algorithms" extension defined in TLS
>    1.2.
> 
> <mglt>
> I understand the reason we do specify that
> hash algorithms that MUST NOT been used. This
> is fine in the context of this document, but
> it seems to me that if we were writing the
> updated specification we may have rather
> mentioned a minimum level of security hash
> function needs to be met - in our case
> SHA-256. I leave the co-authors make the
> appropriated choice.   
> 
> </mglt>
> 
> 
> 8.  IANA Considerations
> 
>    The document updates the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry to change the
>    recommended status of SHA-1 based signature schemes to N (not
>    recommended) as defined by [RFC8447].  The following entries are to
>    be updated:
> 
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>        | Value  |  Description   | Recommended |     Reference     |
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
>        | 0x0201 | rsa_pkcs1_sha1 |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
>        | 0x0203 |   ecdsa_sha1   |      N      | [RFC8446][RFCTBD] |
>        +--------+----------------+-------------+-------------------+
> 
>    Other entries of the resgistry remain the same.
> 
> 
> <mglt>
> It seems to me that TLS 1.2 is using the TLS
> hash and TLS signature registry TLS signature
> registry and TLS 1.3 is using Signature
> Scheme. 
> 
> I suspect that TLS hash values for sha1 and
> md5 should be deprecated. And RFCTBD should
> be added for sha1 and md5. Note that the 
> SHOULD NOT status for CertificateRequest
>  may have prevented such deprecation. 
> 
> A side effect is these code points for
> signature scheme that were assigned for
> compatibility with legacy (TLS 1.2)
> signatures must not be used anymore -  if
> there are no more valid with TLS 1.2. 
> </mglt>
> 
> 
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> -- 
> Daniel Migault
> Ericsson