Re: [TLS] Update on TLS 1.3 Middlebox Issues

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 07 October 2017 11:33 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2017 14:33:37 +0300
In-Reply-To: <EAD84CE1-41A9-40FE-B882-18F077FFD691@akamai.com>
Cc: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
To: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Update on TLS 1.3 Middlebox Issues
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> On 7 Oct 2017, at 4:01, Salz, Rich <rsalz@akamai.com>; wrote:
> 
> Thanks very much for the update.
> 
> There is a third option, name the devices which are known to cause problems, and move forward with the draft as-is.

+1.  I like this third option.

> 2. Tell all those vendors "You have 1 month to fix this. Fix it. Oh,
> it's your customers who don't update? Seems you don't have any
> reasonable update system. Call your customers,

Vendor: Hello customer. We have an update for you that will make TLS 1.3 work.

Customer: No way. We’re in the middle of the year-end processing. We’re not making any configuration changes until the second week of January.

Vendor: But it’s a simple fix. It will make things work better. You’ll need it for Chrome to work with Google.

Customer: What part of “not making any configuration changes” was not clear to you!?