Re: [TLS] Inter-protocol attacks

Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi> Sat, 09 August 2014 18:00 UTC

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Date: Sat, 9 Aug 2014 21:00:04 +0300
From: Ilari Liusvaara <ilari.liusvaara@elisanet.fi>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Inter-protocol attacks
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On Sat, Aug 09, 2014 at 07:58:45AM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Dear all,
> By combining fallback to SSLv3 and session ID based resumption, it is
> possible to do some major damage. This is due to  Antoine
> Delignat-Lavaud according to whois. Slides are at
> https://bh.ht.vc/bh_slides.pdf. This depends on subtleties of TLS
> configuration and interactions with the same origin policy, and
> results in the sort of thing you don't want to see.

The prominent themes in that represetation (excluding the THS part)
seem to be:
- Cookies are just plain insecure[1]
- HTTP servers issuing false authoritative responses.


[1] And extractable bearer tokens in general.


-Ilari