Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data

Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com> Mon, 14 March 2016 19:23 UTC

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Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 12:23:25 -0700
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From: Ryan Hamilton <rch@google.com>
To: Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] analysis of wider impact of TLS1.3 replayabe data
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On Mon, Mar 14, 2016 at 12:12 PM, Geoffrey Keating <geoffk@geoffk.org>;
wrote:

> So, I don't think HTTP is generally safe against attacker-forced
> replay, and would suggest great caution in allowing it.
>

It's worth keeping in mind this recent paper about Replay attacks against
HTTPS <http://blog.valverde.me/2015/12/07/bad-life-advice/#.VucOsJMrIxN>;.
TL;DR: Attackers can already force a browser to replay requests basically
at will. ​As a result, it's not clear that 0-RTT replay makes this
situation worse.