Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Fri, 08 August 2014 13:01 UTC

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To: Alfredo Pironti <alfredo@pironti.eu>
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2014 15:01:01 +0200 (CEST)
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From: mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex)
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
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Alfredo Pironti wrote:
>
> For example, Tor abandoned doing authentication via TLS renegotiation*
> because, among other reasons, "TLS renegotiation to become rarer and rarer
> in the wild, making our own use stand out more" [2].
> If TLS could be used to disguise, both in content type and in traffic
> shape, a renegotiation as normal application data, projects like Tor may
> benefit from it.

What you may have missed in the discussion: this is not about changing
the presence, availability and visibility of renegotiation in TLSv1.2,
TLSv1.1 and TLSv1.0, but exclusively about the visibility of the
ContentInfo in a future TLSv1.3 _which_has_Renegotiation_removed_.


-Martin