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Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00

"Paul Turner" <pturner@equio.com> Thu, 19 October 2017 14:18 UTC

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From: Paul Turner <pturner@equio.com>
To: "'Salz, Rich'" <rsalz@akamai.com>, 'Paul Turner' <PAUL.TURNER@venafi.com>, "'Kaduk, Ben'" <bkaduk@akamai.com>, tls@ietf.org
References: <7E6C8F1F-D341-456B-9A48-79FA7FEC0BC1@gmail.com> <a599d6ad-54db-e525-17d6-6ea882880021@akamai.com> <71e75d23f4544735a9731c4ec3dc7048@venafi.com> <3D2E3E26-B2B9-4B04-9704-0BBEE2E2A8F7@akamai.com>
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Date: Thu, 19 Oct 2017 10:18:21 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
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> -----Original Message-----
> From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Salz, Rich
> Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2017 10:15
> To: Paul Turner <PAUL.TURNER@venafi.com>; Kaduk, Ben
> <bkaduk@akamai.com>; tls@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [TLS] Publication of draft-rhrd-tls-tls13-visibility-00
> 
> 
> ➢     I guess the basic question I'm asking is that if a third party is so powerful
> that they can do what you describe, aren't they going to force an even more
> effective method (trusting their CA so that they can terminate the connection
> as a middle man) on clients so that they don't have to coerce every server?
> 
> The stated goal of this work (and its predecessor) is to allow enterprises to
> capture traffic for later debugging and analysis.  The client could be coming in
> via the generic public Internet, with a stock browser.
> 
> Your question points out a danger of this mechanism: it becomes all too easy
> to “escape” and enable nationwide wiretapping.
> 
> Make sense?
> 
Can you explain how nationwide wiretapping is going to be easy with this plan? Again, EVERY server owner will need to opt-in.
> 
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