Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?

["Short, Todd" <[e-mail]>]

This brings up an interesting point; having a record length that corresponds to the TCP segment size can help hardware implementations such that they don't need to deal with scatter/gather; i.e. one TCP segment corresponds to a single TLS record. This goes along with 8 (or 4) byte record lengths for hardware implementations. 

--
-Todd Short
// Sent from my iPhone
// "One if by land, two if by sea, three if by the Internet."


> On Nov 29, 2015, at 8:40 PM, Peter Gutmann <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <[e-mail]> writes:
> 
>> I believe your proposal is a nice example of putting the cart before the
>> horse. Before proposing something it should be clear what do you want to
>> protect from, what is the threat?
> 
> Exactly.  If you want to thwart traffic analysis, you need to do something
> like what's done by designs like Aqua ("Towards Efficient Traffic-analysis 
> Resistant Anonymity Networks"), or ideas from any of the other anti-traffic-
> analysis work that's emerged in the past decade or two.  You get traffic 
> analysis resistance by, for example, breaking data into fixed-length 
> packets, using cover traffic, and messing with packet timings, not by 
> encrypting TLS headers.
> 
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls